Across the war-torn battlefields and battered cities of Ukraine, high-speed internet is far more than a modern convenience—it is an essential element of modern military defense and survival. In frontline regions like Kherson, where Russian strikes routinely wipe out civilian power grids and terrestrial communications, street-side satellite terminals powered by Elon Musk’s Starlink network provide vital connections for both civilians and military personnel. Yet, a sudden and unexplained slowdown of the Starlink network recently underscored a dangerous reality for Kyiv and its Western allies: Ukraine is utterly dependent on a private American service provider for its battlefield communications, and a viable, military-grade European alternative simply does not exist.
The brief service disruption directly impacted Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against incoming Russian attacks, triggering intense alarm across European capitals. The incident exposed the extreme fragility of relying on a single commercial entity controlled by an unpredictable billionaire, dramatically accelerating Europe’s push to achieve space sovereignty and construct its own independent, military-grade satellite communications network.
While several alternative satellite providers exist, none currently come close to matching the scale, speed, or tactical utility of Starlink. France’s Eutelsat, operating its OneWeb low-Earth orbit service, stands as the primary existing European alternative. However, OneWeb operates roughly 600 active satellites—a fraction of the more than 10,000 satellites currently orbiting in Starlink’s massive mega-constellation.
Meanwhile, the European Union is developing its own state-of-the-art satellite network, known as Iris², designed explicitly to break dependence on foreign providers. But that network will not become fully operational until at least 2029.
For Ukrainian soldiers operating along the perilous frontlines, the lack of an immediate alternative is a matter of life and death. Ukrainian troops, speaking on the condition of anonymity, made clear that uninterrupted connectivity dictates their survival.
"God forbid they shut it off completely, it would be an absolute catastrophe," one Ukrainian soldier said. "I don’t give a damn how much an alternative costs when our lives are on the line."
For now, Ukraine’s most immediate option for alternative coverage is to join Govsatcom, the European Union’s satellite-sharing initiative. However, under current operational mandates, the system cannot be utilized for active military warfare, such as guiding lethal combat drones.
This military limitation was starkly highlighted by Elon Musk himself, who publicly accused Ukrainian forces of violating Starlink’s terms of service by leveraging the satellite network to conduct targeted "drone strikes to kill people."
Asserting that SpaceX had acted to close that specific operational loophole, Musk warned on his social media platform X: "Violation of those terms will result in end of service." He added a blunt assessment of Ukraine’s battlefield reliance: "Were Starlink to be turned off, the Ukrainian front line would collapse immediately."
Why does Starlink dominate in Ukraine?
Starlink, alongside its specialized military-grade offshoot Starshield, is produced and operated by Musk’s aerospace firm, SpaceX. Together, the systems have dominated the global satellite market for years, establishing a near-monopoly on accessible, high-bandwidth low-Earth orbit communications.
Ukraine relies heavily on standard Starlink terminals for everyday command-and-control communications across its armed forces, while relying on Starshield for high-stakes military tasks, particularly drone operations. The low latency and high bandwidth of the network allow Ukrainian operators to transmit real-time video feeds, coordinate tactical movements, and direct precise counter-strikes against advancing Russian forces.
"You can’t employ drone warfare without this kind of high-speed internet connection," explained Vincent Tourret, a defense researcher at the French Institute of International Relations.
The recent connectivity slowdown—which has only recently been restored—brought into sharp focus the immense risks of relying on a US-based commercial provider at a time when political relationships between Kyiv and Washington face growing strain. It triggered a confusing blame game between the U.S. Department of Defense, former President Donald Trump, and Musk over who actually requested or authorized the temporary restrictions on Ukrainian access.
The political volatility surrounding the system has drawn sharp condemnation from European lawmakers. French Member of the European Parliament Christophe Grudler voiced a growing sentiment across the continent, tweeting: "Ukraine’s defence cannot depend on Trump’s or Musk’s whims."
While Starlink has proven to be one of Ukraine’s most formidable assets since the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, its absolute dominance has created a single point of failure. Kari Bingen, director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), highlighted the tactical paradox facing Ukrainian commanders.
"This is a critical military capability that Ukraine relies on, but doesn’t control," Bingen noted, emphasizing the danger of centralizing military communications within a commercial platform subject to external political pressure.
Although alternative satellite networks exist, experts and frontline soldiers agree that none match Starlink’s swift data transfer capabilities. In fast-moving military engagements, latency—the time it takes for data to travel from the user to the satellite and back—can decide the outcome of an engagement.
"It gives us the upper hand when it comes to passing commands—even one or two seconds are critical when we can transfer data and orders faster, and you can really feel that advantage on the battlefield," a Ukrainian soldier explained.
Beyond speed, hardware logistics present another major hurdle. Starlink terminals are compact, lightweight, and relatively inexpensive, enabling Ukrainian troops to mount them easily onto mobile strike units, armored vehicles, and even lightweight unmanned aerial vehicles.
By contrast, hardware for competing systems like Eutelsat’s OneWeb is considerably bulkier. Eva Berneke, former chief executive of the French satellite company, noted that OneWeb terminals "are slightly larger, so they can be fitted on the roof of a car, or on tanks, but they can’t necessarily sit on small drones." Furthermore, Berneke pointed out that competing terminals are roughly five times more expensive than Starlink units, placing a heavy financial burden on large-scale military deployment.
What can the EU offer right now?
Uncertainty surrounding Washington’s long-term security commitments—amplified by Donald Trump’s sharp critiques of NATO and provocative commentary regarding foreign policy—has served as a sharp wake-up call for European leaders. Berneke noted that political friction between Western allies has handed the European Union "some pretty brutal alarm bells."
Reflecting on her tenure at Eutelsat, which began just a month before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Berneke observed a rapid shift in urgency among European defense officials. Authorities urgently turned to European commercial satellite operators to explore how private industry could fill the void should Starlink suddenly become unavailable or compromised.
Public statements from Musk have only deepened European anxieties regarding space dependency. Last year, when Poland’s foreign minister suggested searching for alternative satellite vendors to ensure operational stability, Musk responded dismissively on X, writing: "Be quiet, small man… there is no substitute for Starlink."
In response to the growing vulnerability, European policymakers are shifting their stance, recognizing that modern defense strategies require independent space infrastructure. A spokesperson for the European Commission confirmed that Europe must "strengthen its satellite capacities, urgently."
In the immediate term, Europe’s primary vehicle for satellite cooperation is Govsatcom, an EU initiative launched in January designed to pool and share government-owned and commercial satellite capacities among member states. Although Ukraine is not an official EU member, the European Commission is actively negotiating with Kyiv to integrate Ukrainian defense needs into the Govsatcom framework.
However, Govsatcom in its current form cannot fully replace Starlink’s tactical role. The framework was designed primarily for secure civil and administrative communications, meaning it cannot legally or technically be utilized to direct offensive military operations like drone targeting.
That dynamic could shift by early next year, as the European Commission works to integrate commercial operators, such as Eutelsat’s OneWeb, into the Govsatcom architecture. Such an integration would expand the network’s capacity to cover certain military communication requirements, though it would still fall short of replicating Starshield’s full capabilities.
Berneke expressed confidence that Eutelsat will eventually be able to "support quite a lot of Ukraine’s key military needs." However, satisfying the immense and varied communication demands of a nation engaged in high-intensity war remains an enormous challenge.
In a formal statement, Eutelsat emphasized its strategic position: "As the only European operator of a fully operational Low Earth Orbit constellation, we are committed to providing resilient connectivity to the businesses, governments and communities we serve."
For now, no concrete public timeline exists for when Ukraine will be formally connected to Govsatcom. Even when access is finalized, defense experts view it primarily as a reliable secondary backup rather than a total replacement for Starlink.
Yet, having a functional alternative is vital, according to Vincent Tourret. "If Starlink is shut down, it’s good to have another way to stay connected, but it won’t be enough for strikes or interceptions, at this stage," he said.
Iris² – The EU’s future network
While Govsatcom offers a temporary cushion, European defense strategists view it merely as a stopgap measure until a far more secure platform, named Iris², comes online. Short for Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnection and Security by Satellites, Iris² is Europe’s multi-billion-euro answer to Starlink and Starshield.
Unlike commercial constellations repurposed for security tasks, Iris² is built from the ground up as a defense-first initiative, prioritized for use by European governments, military forces, intelligence agencies, and emergency first responders. Recognizing the critical nature of the conflict on its eastern border, the European Union has guaranteed Ukraine full access to Iris² from the day it becomes operational in 2029.
The program is being spearheaded by SpaceRISE, a joint consortium of major European satellite operators including Eutelsat, SES, and Hispasat. The planned constellation will deploy 348 satellites across low-Earth orbit (LEO) and medium-Earth orbit (MEO).
Although 348 satellites is a fraction of Starlink’s 10,000-strong fleet, defense analysts emphasize that raw numbers do not tell the whole story. Kari Bingen explained that the hybrid orbit structure allows individual satellites to project broader coverage areas across the Earth’s surface.
"Think about a flashlight beaming down—those satellites will be able to cover a greater amount of the Earth, so you need fewer of them," Bingen explained. "They’re all trade offs—I would not take it as a negative, that Iris² is planning for less satellites."
Other analysts remain far more cautious about whether Iris² can dramatically change the tactical balance on the ground. Tourret expressed skepticism regarding the initiative’s timeline and immediate impact, cautioning that "it’s no gamechanger and no great saviour, I’m afraid."
Promotional material released by the EU Space Policy initiative boldly claims: "With Iris², Europe will no longer depend on others for satellite connectivity." Yet, even when Iris² achieves full operational capability, military experts advise against completely severing ties with providers like Starlink.
Instead, modern military strategy relies on the concept of layered redundant communication—ensuring that if one system is jammed, intercepted, or disabled, alternative networks can immediately absorb the traffic. Bingen likened satellite redundancy to everyday cellular networks.
"Users need to think about communications resilience," Bingen said. "So if something happens to one system, you have other ways to maintain connectivity."
Berneke echoed this comparison, noting that mobile users seamlessly drop from 5G down to 4G or 3G when moving through areas with poor signal coverage. "You have multiple networks for resilience. It’s the same idea in warfare," she said.
However, in the context of live combat, a downgrade in connectivity carries severe consequences. While a smartphone user might suffer minor frustration if a photo loads slowly on a legacy network, a drone operator experiencing data latency can lose control of a weapon system mid-flight. As Berneke acknowledged, "That is not a nice situation to have to be in when you’re fighting a war."
Recognizing the urgent need for diverse capabilities, other European defense and technology firms are entering the arena. Finnish telecommunications giant Nokia recently announced a partnership with radar satellite company ICEYE and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine to explore building a sovereign satellite communications infrastructure tailored specifically for Ukrainian military forces.
Simultaneously, a joint initiative dubbed Project Bromo—involving European aerospace heavyweights Airbus, Leonardo, and Thales—aims to develop another high-capacity constellation to rival American dominance. However, Project Bromo remains in its conceptual infancy.
The primary obstacle facing all European space ambitions remains the immense capital and time required to build and deploy complex orbital hardware.
"Space projects take a long time, and need a lot of money," Berneke emphasized, pointing out that designing hardware, manufacturing satellites, securing launch providers, and achieving global orbital coverage requires years of uninterrupted investment.
"Even if you gave me €8bn right now, I don’t think I could have anything up there before 2032-2033," she said.
Why Space is the new defence frontier
Military utilization of space is far from a novel concept; global superpowers have leveraged orbital assets for reconnaissance, navigation, and classified communications since the early days of the Cold War in the 1950s. However, the high-intensity war in Ukraine has dramatically redefined the role of commercial space constellations, proving that low-Earth orbit connectivity is fundamentally embedded in modern ground warfare.
"Communication is so important, and terrestrial communication platforms, whether it’s 5G or fibre, can be attacked on the ground," Berneke observed. "It is a lot harder to shoot down an entire satellite network. That’s not something any military can do right now."
While public attention remains focused on satellite constellations overhead, the vast majority of the world’s commercial and military data still travels along the sea floor. Approximately 99 percent of global transcontinental communication relies on vast networks of subsea fiber-optic cables.
These physical cables present attractive targets for hybrid warfare and physical sabotage. The UK government recently introduced new defense measures designed specifically to patrol and protect critical undersea cables following a sharp spike in suspicious maneuvering by Russian naval vessels near European maritime infrastructure.
"In a crisis or conflict, there are serious concerns that undersea cables will be cut… so if that happens it’s good to have satellite communication as a backup," Bingen noted.
As the war in Ukraine continues to test the boundaries of modern military technology, the conflict has made one reality abundantly clear: control over space communications is no longer just a technical advantage, but a foundational pillar of national sovereignty and battlefield survival.